[Syonyk] acquired giant load banks to test batteries and force materials. These devices consist of an existing giant sink, a measuring device, and a fan. He bought two similar-looking cards from the same Chinese sources, either with a power output of 150W or for about $30. However, upon closer inspection, he discovered that one was a really low price and the other was in danger of exploding.
The batches are rated at 60V and as you can see from the photos, they look pretty much the same at a glance. They offer configurable cut-off voltage and even use 4-wire metering for voltage drop issues on electrical wires.
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It is quite complicated to distinguish fake coins from genuine ones, the generation used by counterfeiters has advanced by leaps and bounds, so even experts have a hard time distinguishing the genuine product from a clever imitation. An indisputable fake logo is rarely the biggest challenge. However, with a fake, as ieee. com reports, counterfeit portions can involve malware or be downright dangerous.
In 2014, the FBI accused [Marc Heera] of promoting clones of the Hondata S300, a plug-in engine module for Honda cars that reads sensors and, depending on their values, can replace idling, aggregated air-fuel, and a plethora of other car/engine-related parameters. What’s the problem, you might ask, unless they’re obviously not original parts?According to Honda, they had a number of issues, such as random engine speed limits and initial failures. While the fake parts of the Hondata S300 were just subpar clones that looked like the part, anything connected to an engine control unit raises huge protection considerations and researchers have shown that through access to the ECU, they can hijack a car’s guide and brakes.
It’s not just car parts being cloned, remember the fake USB-to-serial chips of FTDI-Gate? Entire routers are also being cloned, which doesn’t sound too bad until you realise that the cloners could configure your internet traffic to be redirected through their network for snooping. In 2010 Saudi citizen [Ehab Ashoor] was convicted of buying cloned Cisco Systems gigabit interface converters with the intention of selling them to the U.S Dept of Defense. While nothing sinister was afoot in [Ashoor]’s case other than greed, these routers were to be deployed in Iraq for use by the Marine Corps networks. They were then to be used for security, transmitting troop movements and relaying intelligence from field operations back to HQ.
So who are the cloners and why are they doing it? It is speculated that some of them may be state funded, as there are a lot of countries who do not trust American silicon. Circuits are reverse engineered and find their way to the international market. Then just like the FTDI-Gate case, cloners want to make profits from others intellectual property. This also brings up another question, if there is a mistrust of American silicon, nearly everything is made in China these days so why should we trust anything from there? Even analog circuits can be made to spy on you, as you can see from the piece we recently featured on compromising a processor using an analog charge pump. If you want to defend yourself from such attacks, perhaps look at previous Hackaday Prize finalist, ChipWhisperer.